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In the past two years, the Russian public’s appetite for 
change has increased considerably. A small but growing 
group of Russians blame President Vladimir Putin for 
the country’s problems, and his capacity to deliver 
change is now being questioned. Yet the demands for 
change are taking very different forms, not only in open 
protests but also through latent discontent, and the 
public has not identified a specific alternative leader as a 
potential agent of change. 
In July 2019, the Carnegie Moscow Center and the 
Levada Center, Russia’s main independent polling 
agency, conducted a third poll in two years asking 1,600 
Russians about their readiness for change. The results 
show some striking new trends. A total of 59 percent of 
respondents—17 percent more than two years before—
said that the country needed “decisive comprehensive 
change” (see Figure 1). The Russian publication of this 
research in November 2019 attracted a lot of attention 
from the media and political class. An answer came in 
January 2020 in a form of constitutional changes and 
the resignation of the government. In his annual address 
on January 15, Vladimir Putin said: “Our society is 
clearly calling for change. People want development. 
. . . The pace of change must be expedited every year 
and produce tangible results in attaining worthy living 
standards that would be clearly perceived by the people. 
And, I repeat, they must be actively involved in this 
process.”1
In the first poll in August 2017, much of the Russian 
public expressed a desire for comprehensive change (42 
percent), but nearly an equal number (41 percent) said 
that only “minor” changes were needed.2 
The 2017 poll revealed that Russians wanted their 
government to shift its focus from foreign to domestic 
policy. As Russia had already become “great again” 
thanks to Putin’s perceived foreign policy successes, 
respondents indicated that it was time to concentrate on 
the domestic economy and social issues. The euphoric 




The year 2018 appears to have been a pivotal time. 
According to a separate Levada poll, government 
approval ratings tumbled sharply then and have stayed 
comparably low since.3 An unpopular pension reform 
announced in the summer of 2018, and other unpopular 
economic policies, caused discontent. A strong protest 
vote during the municipal and regional elections in 
September 2018, when several gubernatorial elections 
broke with recent tradition and went to second rounds 
of voting, strengthened the perception that a demand 
for change—however populist, abstract, and unclear—
does exist. Russia’s civil society awakened from its 
slumber and became more active again.4 
Another Levada poll conducted in September 2019 
revealed how Russians’ fears about the country’s 
situation and their mistrust in its leaders had risen since 
2017. The number of people who said they were afraid 
of the regime becoming harsher rose sharply from 17 
to 35 percent. Fear of mass repression and the abuse 
of power increased from 21 to 39 percent and 29 to 
50 percent, respectively. Concern about the state of the 
world in general had also risen. A total of 53 percent of 
Russians said they were afraid of a world war erupting—
an increase from 40 percent in 2017.5
WHO WANTS CHANGE?
The Carnegie-Levada 2019 poll results suggest that five 
social groups, with very different profiles, are most in 
favor of comprehensive change:
• People between ages forty and fifty-four (63 
percent said they wanted decisive change). These 
are people who will soon enter pre-retirement. They 
are unhappy with pension reform and the labor 
market.
SOURCE: Carnegie Moscow Center and Levada Center poll of 1,600 Russians, conducted in July 2019.
NOTE: The question was, "Do you think our country needs changes?"
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• People with higher education (62 percent). 
• People with low incomes, such as those who can 
barely afford to buy groceries (66 percent).
• Residents of midsize cities (60 percent). Sentiment 
among Moscow residents was less pro-reform at 54 
percent. 
• Critics of the current ruling regime (80 percent). 
This group disapproves of Putin’s job performance 
and does not want him to stay in office after 2024.
Two contrasting social groups potentially stand to 
benefit from change. The first group forms the basis of 
the economy and Russia’s consumerist society—in other 
words, it constitutes people commonly considered part of 
the middle class and the private sector. The second group 
comprises people whose personal and socioeconomic 
conditions are far from stellar but are not hopeless: public 
sector employees, retirees, and the poor. 
Among those who do not support change are people who 
did not finish their secondary education; people over age 
fifty-five, who are more likely to harbor concerns that 
any changes might make things worse; and Muscovites 
(Moscow residents), of which 18 percent do not want 
change of any kind. These residents enjoy a better quality 
of life than those in other parts of the country and are 
therefore less inclined to change anything. This state of 
affairs once again confirms the old adage that Moscow 
and Russia are not one and the same.
WHAT KIND OF CHANGE IS  NEEDED?
When asked the open-ended question of what exactly 
needs to change in Russia, most respondents mentioned 
socioeconomic issues. This continues the trend Carnegie 
identified in 2017—that Russians believe the goal of 
restoring the country’s prestige and greatness had been 
accomplished and that it is now time for the government 
to focus on domestic problems.
Respondents said that the overall standard of living 
needed to improve, and around one-quarter of them 
referred to low salaries and pensions. There were also 
appeals by 11 percent to reduce high utility payments 
and the cost of medicine, groceries, and other essentials. 
Ten percent believed that fighting corruption should be 
the first priority. Nine percent called for easier access to 
healthcare. Because it is getting harder to see doctors, 
one has to either spend a lot of time waiting for a free 
doctor’s appointment or pay for an appointment (see 
Figure 2).
Respondents were also given a list of measures the 
government could take and asked to prioritize them. 
As with the open-ended question, there was much less 
interest in democratizing the political system than in 
fixing socioeconomic policies. No more than 10 percent 
of respondents named, among their top priorities, 
holding free and fair elections, maintaining an 
independent judiciary, and expanding democratic rights 
and freedom. These issues were generally mentioned by 
the youngest and most educated Russian respondents, as 
well as by residents of large cities—but not dramatically 
more than by the rest of the respondents. 
Answers to both questions naturally reflect people’s 
perceptions of the most serious social problems facing 
Russia. In the last twenty years of regular polling 
by Levada, people have consistently mentioned two 
concerns: price increases and general poverty. In 
August 2019, 59 percent cited the first concern and 
42 percent cited the second. However, both problems 
have gradually become less of a priority in recent years. 
Concerns about corruption, on the other hand, are 
now at an all-time high—41 percent (see Figure 3). As 
economic problems have increased and respect for the 
regime has declined, the public has begun to express 
its discontent with the establishment in stronger terms. 
People are increasingly outraged by reports of the 
extravagant lifestyles of government officials, executives 
of state-owned corporations, and members of the 
president’s inner circle. 
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SOURCE: Source: "Trevozhashhie problemy" [Troubling problems], press release, Levada Center, September 25, 2019,
https://www.levada.ru/2019/09/25/trevozhashhie-problemy-2/.
NOTE: The question was, "Which of the following problems in our society worry you the most;
which problems do you consider most serious?"
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WHO CAN OFFER A ROAD MAP FOR 
CHANGE?
Increasingly, demands for change have political 
connotations, and it is becoming more common to hear 
criticism of Putin. Even though blame is still shifted 
to other actors—such as government bureaucrats, the 
prime minister, individual ministers, and oligarchs—
Putin increasingly receives his share of criticism and is 
treated on the same level as other government officials.
This is a very important development. After Russia’s 
seizure of Crimea, Putin became the country’s symbol 
and standard-bearer, an untouchable political deity. But 
his divine essence began to dwindle after 2018 and a 
human being reemerged, whom many people appear to 
SOURCE: Carnegie Moscow Center and Levada Center poll of 1,600 Russians, conducted in July 2019.
NOTE: The open-ended question was, “Identify those Russian politicians who can o er program 
of changes that you might support."
F IGURE 4a
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THERE IS NO SUCH POLITICIAN
DIFFICULT TO ANSWER
like a whole lot less. And the stronger this perception 
becomes, the lower Putin’s electoral, confidence, and 
job approval ratings will be. At the same time, this 
decline in confidence in Putin does not translate into 
a boost for his rivals. No other politician has wholly 
captured the trust of the public. Instead, when asked 
which Russian politician “can offer a road map for 
change,” the number of people who have no answer at 
all (39 percent) is the highest. Moreover, this figure has 
risen sharply since 2017 and reflects the continued lack 
of alternatives to Putin.
Putin remains at the top of the list of potential 
modernizers. However, this status seems to be a legacy 
SOURCE: Carnegie Moscow Center and Levada Center poll of 1,600 Russians, conducted in July 2019.
NOTE: The open-ended question was, “Identify those Russian politicians who can o er program 
of changes that you might support."
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of his former stellar rating. Putin’s rating as a person 
capable of changing the country’s situation for the better 
has dropped significantly. Behind him in the list stand 
two veteran leaders of the parliamentary “systemic” 
(loyal) opposition, Vladimir Zhirinovsky of the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia and Communist Party leader 
Gennady Zyuganov—both of whom trail Putin by a 
large margin. Not far behind them is Pavel Grudinin, 
who established his popularity among Russians when 
he became the Communist Party presidential candidate 
in 2017–2018. Grudinin currently occupies the 
populist niche that under different circumstances might 
belong to non-systemic (which means he is not allowed 
to participate in any kind of elections) opposition 
leader Alexei Navalny. Navalny is listed among the top 
five potential modernizers, receiving the same level 
of support as Putin’s most popular cabinet member, 
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (see Figure 4a).
When separating out Muscovites, the list becomes 
markedly different (see Figure 4b). Their choices vary 
more widely, which seems to run counter to their general 
satisfaction with life in the capital. But they are expressing 
an opinion not just about the quality of life in their city 
but discontent with the general state of affairs in Russia. 
Moscow residents are bolder and more proactive in their 
search for alternative political figures, which makes the 
situation in the capital much more polarized.
INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
CHANGES
The most recent Carnegie-Levada poll makes it clear 
that a change in attitudes is under way in Russia. But it 
is far from clear that respondents are prepared to alter 
their own behavior in order to meet the challenges of 
societal change (see Figure 5).
About half of the respondents are prepared for some 
form of career change and professional retraining (the 
number is significantly higher—almost 70 percent—for 
those below age forty). But people are much less likely to 
embrace a change that results in higher living costs and 
the potential loss of their familiar position in society. 
Only one-quarter of respondents are prepared to pay in 
part for medical services or to lose some of their social 
benefits (the portion jumps to about one-third among 
those below age forty). Just 17 percent of respondents 
are ready to accept paying more for education; even 
among the most affluent group, only one-quarter of 
the people would accept that. Practically no one would 
support an increase in housing and utility costs in 
exchange for improved quality of services (9 percent of 
total responses, with no significant disparities among 
different demographic groups). Most likely, the public 
does not believe that rising costs will help to improve 
the quality of services.
It comes as no surprise that Russians over age fifty-
five, especially those over sixty-five, as well as the 
impoverished and poorly educated, are among those 
least prepared to sacrifice anything to improve their 
future standard of living. In Moscow and other cities, 
residents are unwilling to pay for such improvements 
out of their own pockets. The Carnegie-Levada 2017 
poll yielded similar results. The fact that wealth and 
relative poverty can often be found side by side in 
Moscow only partially explains this phenomenon. 
Separate focus groups that Levada has hosted indicate 
that even many young and active Muscovites would like 
to receive public benefits. Even residents of the country’s 
largest economic powerhouse—a place that provides 
plenty of well-paid employment opportunities—are 
not ashamed to accept handouts from the state. This 
just confirms earlier conclusions about how a great 
many Russians, especially Muscovites, frequently rely 
on pragmatic paternalism when thinking about their 
economic circumstances.
Most respondents do not believe that they can influence 
the introduction or direction of future changes; the data 
reveal that 60 percent of the people think in these terms. 
This is the case for most senior citizens and the poor, who 
are forced to rely on the state for assistance. As many as 
70 percent of these people feel that they are unable to 
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affect any changes. They quite understandably see the 
state as the main political and economic actor, since it 
controls resources and has the necessary mechanisms to 
manage and distribute national wealth. 
This line of reasoning helps to explain why three-quarters 
of the Russian public supports state intervention in 
the economy. Most people are simply unaware of any 
other possibilities to address economic problems and do 
not understand the principles of the market economy. 
This reliance on the state stems partly from feelings of 
despair and powerlessness and partly from a lack of 
knowledge about possible alternatives. The Carnegie-
Levada polls and other similar research demonstrate 
that many Russian citizens do not believe that their 
active participation—for example, in elections, charity 
and volunteer work, and protests—might help bring 
about better changes.
At the same time, almost 40 percent of the respondents 
said that they can influence the changes, at least 
somewhat. These are mostly people under age forty, 
affluent people, and Muscovites. Up to half of the 
members of these groups can be described as moderate 
SOURCE: Carnegie Moscow Center and Levada Center poll of 1,600 Russians, conducted in July 2019.
NOTE: The question was, "How prepared are you for changes in exchange for higher quality of life?"
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optimists. One could attribute these views to their age 
and youthful naivete, but the young, most educated, 
and affluent generally have more civic-minded people 
in their midst. 
Apart from participating in elections, which is 
increasingly a ritual form of expressing confidence or no 
confidence in the current regime, civic activism consists 
of uniting with others to solve problems jointly. That 
takes various forms, including signing open letters and 
petitions and filing complaints and inquiries in various 
institutions. At the same time, people do not really see 
this form of activism as a way to achieve serious changes; 
rather, it serves as a method of fighting for one’s rights, a 
technique that can lead to minor improvements in one’s 
daily life. So far, Russians lack extensive experience in 
civic activism. Only one-third of the population appears 
to take part in such activity, but the number appears to 
be growing.6
CONCLUSION
The fact that so many Russians are ready for change 
indicates that, while not gearing up for a revolution, 
society wants at least to nudge the government toward 
changes that are primarily socioeconomic but also 
administrative and political in nature. But the public 
does not want change at its own expense. Russians 
still believe that the state is the main tool for the 
redistribution of national wealth and that it must do its 
job more efficiently. There are numerous contradictions 
in people’s views—for instance, while they want 
comprehensive changes, they are reticent to bear the 
higher costs for social benefits and other services. 
Nevertheless, their collective perceptions do make some 
sense: if the state takes a lot of resources, it has to give a 
lot of resources back, too.
If the thirst for political change continues to gain 
momentum in Russia, a full-scale demand for political 
freedoms and alternatives may emerge quite soon. 
At least, more civic resistance to some government 
initiatives is inevitable (at different levels), and there 
is an evident readiness for new faces in the political 
process. If a civic movement coalesces, government 
authorities will be forced to change not only their 
methods of management, potentially making the 
state more modern and technocratic, but also allow, 
conceivably, for greater political freedoms. So far, the 
state appears totally unprepared to do this. In fact, it 
has been drifting toward greater authoritarianism. Here 
is where the key contradiction of the next few years 
lies: society will be developing faster than the state, 
potentially leaving the latter behind.
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